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ABSTRACT
Multiple studies in the past have analyzed the role and dy-
namics of the Twitter social network during real world events.
However, little work has explored the content of other so-
cial media services, or compared content across two net-
works during real world events. We believe that social me-
dia platforms like Facebook also play a vital role in dis-
seminating information on the Internet during real world
events. In this work, we study and characterize the content
posted on the world’s biggest social network, Facebook, and
present a comparative analysis of Facebook and Twitter con-
tent posted during 16 real world events. Contrary to existing
notion that Facebook is used mostly as a private network,
our findings reveal that more than 30% of public content
that was present on Facebook during these events, was also
present on Twitter. We then performed qualitative analysis
on the content spread by the most active users during these
events, and found that over 10% of the most active users
on both networks post spam content. We used stylometric
features from Facebook posts and tweet text to classify this
spam content, and were able to achieve an accuracy of over
99% for Facebook, and over 98% for Twitter. This work is
aimed at providing researchers with an overview of Face-
book content during real world events, and serve as basis for
more in-depth exploration of its various aspects like infor-
mation quality, and credibility during real world events.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscella-
neous
Keywords
Online Social Media, Events, Facebook
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, online social media has stamped
its authority as one of the largest information propaga-
tors on the Internet. Nearly 25% of the world’s pop-
ulation uses at least one social media service today. 1
1http://www.emarketer.com/Article/
Social-Networking-Reaches-Nearly-One-Four-Around-World/
1009976
People across the globe actively use social media plat-
forms like Twitter and Facebook for spreading infor-
mation, or learning about real world events these days.
A recent study revealed that social media activity in-
creases up to 200 times during major events like elec-
tions, sports, or natural calamities [28]. This swollen
activity has drawn great attention from the computer
science research community. Content and activity on
Twitter, in particular, has been widely studied by re-
searchers during real-world events [1, 12, 18, 27, 32].
However, few studies have looked at social media plat-
forms other than Twitter to study real-world events [3,
10, 23]. Surprisingly, there has been hardly any work on
studying content and activity on Facebook during real
world events [33], which is five times bigger than Twit-
ter in terms of the number of monthly active users. 2
Facebook is currently, the largest online social net-
work in the world, having more than 1.28 billion monthly
active users. 3 However, unlike Twitter, Facebook’s
fine-grained privacy settings make majority of its con-
tent private, and publicly inaccessible. About 72% Face-
book users set their posts to private. 4 This private na-
ture of Facebook has been a major challenge in collect-
ing and analyzing its content in the computer science
research community. But even with a small percent-
age of content being public, this content (approx. 1.33
billion posts per day [7]) is much more than the entire
Twitter content (approx. 500 million tweets per day). 5
This mere volume of the publicly available Facebook
content makes it a potentially rich source of informa-
tion. In addition, recent introduction of features like
hashtag support [19] and Graph search for posts [26],
have largely increased the level of visibility of public
content on Facebook, either directly or indirectly. Users
can now search for topics and hashtags to look for con-
tent, in a fashion highly similar to Twitter; thus making
the public Facebook content more visible and consum-
2http://www.diffen.com/difference/Facebook vs Twitter
3http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
4http://mashable.com/2013/07/31/
facebook-embeddable-posts/
5http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/
000119312513390321/d564001ds1.htm
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able by its users. This increasing public visibility, and
an enormous user-base, potentially makes Facebook one
of the largest and most widespread sources of informa-
tion on the Internet, especially during real world events,
when social media activity swells significantly.
With such dominance in terms of volume of content
and user base, it is surprising that Facebook content
hasn’t yet been studied a lot in the research commu-
nity. In this work, we explore whether there even exists
content related to real world events on Facebook? If so,
are Facebook and Twitter cognate networks in terms of
content during real world events? To what extent does
their content overlap in terms of numbers and quality?
To answer these questions, we present a comparative
analysis between Facebook and Twitter content during
16 real-world events. Our broad findings and contribu-
tions are as follows:
• For 13 out of the 16 events analyzed, we found
that 30.56% of textual content that appeared on
Facebook, also appeared on Twitter during real
world events.
• Real world events appear fairly quickly on Face-
book. We found that on average, an unprece-
dented event appeared on Facebook in just over
11 minutes after taking place in the real world.
For Twitter, this statistic has been previously re-
ported as over 2 hours for generic events [22].
• Characterization and analysis of spam content on
Facebook and Twitter. Using only stylometric fea-
tures extracted from textual content posted on
these networks, we were able to achieve accuracies
of over 99% and 98% on Facebook and Twitter
respectively.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
at comparing Facebook and Twitter content, and char-
acterizing Facebook content at such a large scale dur-
ing real world events. This work uncovers the poten-
tial of Facebook in disseminating information during
real-world events. Knowing that Facebook has a high
overlap with Twitter, and large amounts of information
about real world events, government agencies can use
Facebook as a platform to reach out to masses during
critical events. Event-related content on Facebook can
also be studied further by researchers to study informa-
tion credibility on this network, and identify bad quality
sources of information to prevent rumor propagation on
Facebook during such events.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2
discusses the related work; the data collection method-
ology is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents our
comparative analysis of Twitter and Facebook content.
Qualitative analysis of content is presented in Section 5,
followed by spam analysis in Section 6. Section 7 sum-
marizes our findings, and discusses the limitations.
2. RELATED WORK
A recent survey of 5,173 adults suggested that 30% of
people get their news from Facebook, while only 8% re-
ceive news from Twitter and 4% from Google Plus [11].
These numbers suggest that researchers need to look
beyond Twitter, and study other social networks to get
a better understanding of the flow of information and
content on online social media during major real world
events. Although there has been some work related to
events on Wikipedia [23] and Flickr [3], there hardly
exists any work on studying Facebook content during
real world events. Osborne et al. recently examined
how Facebook, Google Plus and Twitter perform at re-
porting breaking news [22]. Authors of this work iden-
tified 29 major events from the public streams of these
three social media platforms, and found that Twitter
was the fastest among them. Authors also concluded
that all media carry the same major events. However,
there was no analysis on the type and similarity of con-
tent that was found across these social media services.
Our dataset is partially similar to the one used by au-
thors in this work, but our objectives differ. While Os-
borne et al. performed a comparative analysis on these
networks for finding which one does better at breaking
news, our emphasis is on characterizing Facebook con-
tent, and comparing it with that of Twitter during real
world events. Further, while Osborne et al. collected
a random stream of data from Twitter and Facebook
over 3 weeks (which, by itself, is a research challenge),
and extracted events from this data; we took an oppo-
site approach. We collected only event-specific data for
major events spanning over a much longer period of 9
months. This approach gave us a richer and bigger set
of event-specific data (tweets and Facebook posts).
Real world events on Twitter.
In recent years, studying Twitter has been the main
focus for researchers in context of real world events.
Kwak et al. [18] showed a big overlap between real-world
news headlines and Twitter’s trending topics. Authors
of this work crawled the entire Twitter network, and
showed that the majority (over 85%) of topics on Twit-
ter were headline news or persistent news in nature.
This work triggered researchers in the entire computer
science community to explore Twitter as a news me-
dia platform during real-world events. Other research
also highlights the use of Twitter as a news reporting
platform [16, 21]. Petrovic et al. recently conducted
a comparative study on 77 days worth of tweets and
Newswire articles, and discovered that Twitter reports
the same events as newswire providers, in addition to
a long tail of minor events ignored by mainstream me-
dia. Interestingly, their findings revealed that, neither
stream, i.e. Twitter or newswire, leads the other when
dealing with major news events [24].
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Twitter has been used widely during emergency situ-
ations, such as wildfires [4], hurricanes [13], floods [30]
and earthquakes [6, 17, 27]. Journalists have hailed
the immediacy of the service which allowed “to report
breaking news quickly - in many cases, more rapidly
than most mainstream media outlets” [25]. Sakaki et
al. [27] explored the potential of the real-time nature
of Twitter and proposed an algorithm to detect occur-
rence of earthquakes by simply monitoring a stream of
tweets in real-time. Here, the authors took advantage of
the fact that users tweet about events like earthquakes
as soon as they take place in the real world, and were
able to detect 96% of all the earthquakes larger than a
certain intensity.
The overwhelmingly quick-response, and public na-
ture of Twitter, along with its tremendous reach across
the globe have made it the primary focus for researchers
to study. In this work, we try to bring out the relevance
of Facebook during real-world events by comparing its
content with data from Twitter. Given that Twitter
has already been well-studied in this context, we be-
lieve that this would be a sound comparison to estab-
lish Facebook’s grit as a content sharing platform during
real-world events.
3. METHODOLOGY
We now discuss the methodology we used for collect-
ing event specific data from Facebook and Twitter. We
selected a combination of medium, and high impact
events in terms of social media activity. Eight out of
the 16 events we selected, had more than 100,000 posts
on both Facebook and Twitter; 6 of these 8 events saw
over 1 million tweets.
3.1 Event specific data collection
We used the MultiOSN framework [5] for collecting
event specific data from multiple social media platforms.
MultiOSN uses REST based, keyword search API for
collecting public Facebook posts, and Twitter’s search
and streaming APIs for collecting public tweets. The
selection of events to capture, and related keywords
was manual. A similar technique has been previously
used by researchers, to collect event-specific data [9, 13].
The same keywords were used to collect data for both
Facebook and Twitter, in order to avoid bias. Table 1
presents the detailed statistics of our dataset, in chrono-
logical order of occurrence of the events. The detailed
description of these events can be found in Table 2.
3.2 Challenges with Facebook data
Similar to Twitter, Facebook’s Graph API provides
keyword search capability, which can be used to search
across all public historic data on Facebook. However,
Facebook does not provide streaming capability for col-
lection of relevant data in real time. Thus, in order
to collect real time data from Facebook, we had to
query the API continuously at regular intervals. The
limited amount of data fields available from the Face-
book API poses even bigger challenges with data anal-
ysis on Facebook. Most social networks have three fun-
damental types of data, viz. user profile, content, and
network data. However, due to Facebook’s highly re-
strictive privacy policies, the network data is virtually
never available publicly. Also, the profile data provides
nothing more than the first name, last name, and gen-
der in most cases. User generated content is thus, the
only part of data which is easily available publicly. The
absence of network and profile data highly reduces the
scope of a lot of analysis, which can be done on net-
works like Twitter. In this work, we are thus bound to
limit our analysis on content.
4. CONTENT OVERLAP
This section presents our comparative analysis of Face-
book and Twitter content. We also characterize Face-
book content, and highlight the cross network content
sharing habits of Facebook and Twitter users.
4.1 Common textual content
In an attempt to gauge the level of similarity be-
tween the content posted on Facebook and Twitter dur-
ing an event, we extracted all the textual content from
our complete dataset and looked for overlaps. To com-
pare textual content, we extracted all unique keywords
posted during each event on both social media, and
stemmed them using Python NLTK’s Porter Stemmer.
Stemming is a natural language processing technique of
reducing inflected words to their base, or root word. For
example, stemming the words argumentative and argu-
ments will both yield their root word argument. We
then compared Facebook and Twitter content for each
event, and found an average overlap of 6.02% (σ = 2.3).
The highest amount of overlap was found to be 9.7%
during the Indian Premiere League (IPL) cricket tour-
nament. We noticed that despite the 140 character limit
on tweets (and no limit on post length on Facebook),
Twitter generated more unique stems during 13 out of
the 16 events. On average, across the 16 events, Twit-
ter generated 3.69 times the number of unique stems
as Facebook (σ = 4.9). 6 Interestingly, the 3 events
which witnessed more unique stems on Facebook than
on Twitter, happened to be totally local to India. These
events were the Cyclone Phailin, the Floods in North
India, and creation of the new state, Telangana. This
hints towards more public activity on Facebook, than
on Twitter during real world events occurring in India.
6We did not consider the Metro North Train Derailment
event while calculating this value, since the data size was
insignificant, and the Twitter:Facebook ratio for this event
was skewed (161.03)
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Event Name Duration FB posts FB users Tweets Twitter Users
Indian Premier League Apr 1 - Jun 7 662,459 381,925 2,627,197 485,632
Iran Earthquake Apr 16 - Apr 17 2,779 2,537 171,232 113,602
Boston Blasts Apr 16 - Apr 20 1,480,467 1,213,990 2,840,570 1,714,253
Kashmir Earthquake May 1 - May 6 1,043 1,002 86,541 35,786
Mothers Day Shooting May 13 - May 14 5 5 8,632 7,050
Oklahoma Tornado May 20 - May 31 1,394,855 992,378 2,393,058 1,388,769
London Terror Attack May 23 - May 31 86,083 68,966 361,460 185,145
North India Floods Jun 14 - Aug 8 211,388 150,212 147,416 63,527
Champions Trophy Jun 16 - Jun 26 349,306 241,419 1,016,605 567,024
Birth of Royal Baby Jul 15 - Aug 18 90,096 74,174 1,830,696 1,083,955
Creation of new Telangana state Jul 31 - Aug 16 253,926 158,255 135,580 37,364
Washington Navy Yard Shooting Sep 16 - Oct 1 4,562 3,091 349,768 173,267
Cyclone Phailin Oct 12 - Oct 19 60,016 43,096 110,047 46,955
Typhoon Haiyan Nov 8 - Nov 13 486,325 355,705 1,257,171 610,809
Metro North Train Derailment Dec 1 - Dec 6 1,165 1,036 28,315 16,830
Death of Nelson Mandela Dec 5 - Dec 22 1,318,854 1,109,783 4,104,463 2,077,719
Table 1: Total amount of data collected for the 16 events tracked; ordered chronologically.
These overlap percentages, however, suffered from a
drawback because of unequal content on Facebook and
Twitter. For example, if Facebook generated x unique
stems, and Twitter generated y = 4x unique stems dur-
ing an event, mathematically, the overlap would not be
more than 25%, even if all x unique stems on Facebook
were present on Twitter. To dampen the effect of the
disproportionate content sizes on the content overlap,
we then calculated the content overlap in terms of the
percentage of content on one social media which is also
present on the other. This analysis revealed a much
higher overlap. We discovered that for the 13 events
where Twitter generated more content than Facebook,
30.56% of content which was present on Facebook, was
also present on Twitter (σ = 17.4). Similarly, for the
3 events where Facebook generated more content than
Twitter, 23.72% of content which was present on Twit-
ter, was also present on Facebook (σ = 3.1). We believe
that this is a significant amount of overlap in textual
content on both these networks; especially considering
the fact that the 140 character rate limit on Twitter
introduces a lot of shortened words, and makes its con-
tent very different from the content posted on Facebook
without a character limit.
We also compared content across events, for the three
most popular events (in terms of the number of posts)
on both Facebook and Twitter, viz. Boston Blasts, Ok-
lahoma Tornado, and death of Nelson Mandela. Inter-
estingly, we found a big overlap between Facebook con-
tent during Boston Blasts, and Oklahoma Tornado. In-
fact, Facebook content during Boston Blasts was more
similar to Facebook content during the Oklahoma Tor-
nado (24.07% overlap), than Twitter content during
Boston Blasts (14.12% overlap). Similarly, Twitter con-
tent during Boston Blasts was found to be slightly more
similar to Twitter content during the death of Nelson
Mandela (8.89% overlap), than Facebook content dur-
ing the Boston Blasts (7.81% overlap). This reflects the
heterogeneous posting habits of Facebook and Twitter
users, where content within one social network tends to
be more similar during two different events, than con-
tent across two social networks during the same event.
To summarize, we found a significant overlap between
Facebook and Twitter content during all the 16 events,
and we also discovered that public Facebook content
during two similar events tends to be more similar to
each other, than Twitter content during the same events.
4.2 Common hashtags
Facebook in June 2013, rolled out the hashtag fea-
ture, which works similar to hashtags on Twitter [19].
We decided to study the hashtags posted on Facebook
during the 16 events we studied, and compare them
with the hashtags posted on Twitter. Table 3 shows
the number of unique hashtags we found on Facebook
and Twitter during the 16 events. On averge, Twitter
produced 16.28 times the number of hashtags as Face-
book (σ = 29.8). Similar to content overlap, we cal-
culated hashtag overlap on Facebook and Twitter, and
found an average overlap of 6.02% (σ = 3.2) across the
16 events (max. 12.15%, Cyclone Phailin). This value
was almost identical to content overlap calculated in the
previous section. Further, we found that for 14 out of
the 16 events featuring more hashtags on Twitter than
Facebook, 33.69% hashtags present on Facebook, were
also present on Twitter (σ = 8.9). For the remaining
2 events, 19.08% of hashtags present on Twitter, were
also present on Facebook (σ = 3.5).
As previously mentioned, Facebook officially launched
hashtag support on June 12, 2013 [19], which means
that 7 out of the 16 events in our dataset had already
been concluded before this happened. This seemed rea-
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Event Description
Indian Premier League 6th edition of the Indian Premiere League cricket tournament. Tournament was amidst spot-fixing contro-
versies during its last leg.
Iran Earthquake Earthquake of magnitude 7.7 struck mountainous area in Iran, close to the border with Pakistan.
Boston Blasts Twin bomb blasts near the finish line during the final moments of the Boston Marathon. Police used Twitter
to capture suspects.
Kashmir Earthquake 5.8 magnitude earthquake struck Jammu and Kashmir, India.
Mothers Day Shooting 20 killed in New Orleans, USA, when two armed men open fired during Mother’s Day parade
Oklahoma Tornado Major tornado hit Oklahoma, invoking loss worth millions of dollars; impacting lives of thousands.
London Terror Attack British Army soldier, Lee Rigby attacked and killed in a terrorist attack by Michael Adebolajo and Michael
Adebowale in Woolwich, southeast London.
North India Floods Heavy rains, multiple burst clouds in the state of Uttarakhand, North India, causing major floods. Thousands
dead, missing, and homeless.
Champions Trophy Last edition of the ICC Champions Trophy, a One Day International cricket tournament held in England
and Wales.
Birth of Royal Baby Prince William and Kate Middleton of the British Royal Family gave birth to Prince George of Cambridge.
Creation of Telangana Ruling party Indian National Congress resolved to request the Central government to form a separate state
of Telangana, as the 29th state of India.
Washington Navy Yard
Shooting
Lone gunman Aaron Alexis shot 12 people, injured 3 others in a mass shooting inside the Washington Navy
Yard in Southeast Washington, D.C.
Cyclone Phailin Severe cyclonic storm Phailin was the second-strongest tropical cyclone ever to make landfall in India.
Typhoon Haiyan Powerful tropical cyclone that devastated portions of Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines.
Metro North Train De-
railment
Metro-North Railroad Hudson Line passenger train derailed near the Spuyten Duyvil station in the New
York City borough of the Bronx. 4 killed; 59 injured.
Death of Nelson Man-
dela
Nelson Mandela, the first President of South Africa elected in a fully representative democratic election,
died at the age of 95 after suffering from a prolonged respiratory infection.
Table 2: Description of the 16 events for which we collected data.
sonable explanation for the significantly low number of
hashtags on Facebook, as compared to Twitter, in our
dataset. However, we found notable presence of hash-
tags even before Facebook officially rolled out hashtag
support. Figure 1 shows a graph of the number of total
hashtags found per post, during the 16 events on Face-
book and Twitter. The events are arranged in chrono-
logical order from left to right. As is evident from the
graph, hashtags were posted on Facebook even before
June 12. However, a notable increase in the number
of hashtags per Facebook post is visible after the India
Floods event, for which, we started data collection on
June 14. One possible reason for the presence of hash-
tags on Facebook even before the official launch of its
support, could have been Twitter users pushing their
tweets to Facebook via apps like HootSuite, Facebook
for Twitter, etc. However, this wasn’t true, since we
found that over 90% of Facebook posts which contained
hashtags, came from Facebook (web and mobile apps)
itself. It is also evident that the number of hashtags
used on Twitter is much more than that on Facebook,
during almost all events.
Twitter was the first social media service to start the
use of hashtags in 2009. 7 The presence of hashtags on
Facebook even before official support, thus highlights
how users tend to carry their posting habits across mul-
tiple social networks; in this case, from Twitter to Face-
book. The statistics we presented in this subsection,
along with those from the previous subsection, indicate
that the public content on Facebook and Twitter during
real world events is reasonably similar in terms of text,
7http://twitter.about.com/od/Twitter-Hashtags/a/
The-History-Of-Hashtags.htm
and hashtags. However, the amount of public content
produced by Twitter is much more than that produced
by Facebook during real world events. To the best of
our knowledge, no work in the past has studied any
aspects of the use of hashtags on Facebook.
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Figure 1: Number of hashtags per post on
Facebook and Twitter. Hashtags have been
present in Facebook posts even before Facebook
launched official support in June, 2013.
4.3 Timeliness of content
For unprecedented events where timeliness can be
critical, we extracted the timestamps of the first Face-
book post published about the event. We could not ex-
tract the correct first tweet about any such event, since
unlike Facebook, Twitter’s search API is not exhaus-
tive, and does not return all past tweets. Also, given
that such events are unexpected, it was hard to initi-
ate data collection instantly after an event took place,
and be able to collect the very first tweet. We sorted the
posts in our dataset, in increasing order of their publish-
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Event Facebook Twitter Common
North India Floods 5,867 14,127 1,296
Boston Blasts 20,538 74,889 6,222
Oklahoma Tornado 14,487 56,541 4,844
Mothers Day Shooting 0 496 0
London Terror Attack 1,558 10,648 678
IPL 12,438 66,702 4,434
Navy Yard Shooting 910 9,669 465
Champions Trophy 9,925 65,371 3,044
Birth of Royal Baby 8,504 72,985 3,862
Kashmir Earthquake 35 3,609 11
Iran Earthquake 81 6,402 16
Creation of Telangana 6,378 5,781 1,306
Cyclone Phailin 2,898 4,143 763
Typhoon Haiyan 36,256 24,793 3,862
Metro North Derailment 182 1,474 75
RIP Nelson Mandela 29,787 89,193 8,096
Table 3: Number of unique hashtags posted dur-
ing the 16 events on Facebook and Twitter.
ing time, and manually read the post content to find the
first appearance of a relevant post. We observed that
for the 6 such events that we investigated (viz. Boston
Blasts, London Terror Attack, Washington Navy Yard
Shooting, Kashmir Earthquake, Iran Earthquake, and
Metro North Train Derailment), the first post on Face-
book appeared, on average, 11 minutes 1.5 seconds (σ =
10 minutes 11 seconds) after the event took place in the
real world (Max. 25 minutes, 53 seconds, Washington
Navy yard Shooting). Interestingly, during the Boston
Marathon Blasts, the first Facebook post occurred just
1 minute 13 seconds after the first blast, which was 2
minutes 44 seconds before the first tweet [9].
Osborne et al. conducted a similar experiment, and
reported a much higher latency of 2.36 hours for Twit-
ter, and 9.89 hours for Facebook over 29 events [22].
One possible reason for this higher latency could be the
difference in the kind of events we tracked. While Os-
borne et al. identified events from a Twitter stream
of trending topics, we focused our analysis on unprece-
dented events, which do not become trending topics im-
mediately after taking place in the real world.
This analysis depicts that when an unprecedented
event takes place in the real world, it appears very
quickly on Facebook. With results from our previous
sections, we conjecture that Facebook can be a rich and
timely source of information during real world events.
However, one rare question which remains unexplored
is, if there exists content which appears on both Twitter
and Facebook at the same time. We explore the same
in the next subsection.
4.4 Content appearing at the same time
We extracted a total of 57,227 URLs which appeared
on both Facebook and Twitter during the 16 events,
and found that 382 of these URLs were posted on both
the networks at exactly the same time. We extracted
the app / platform using which these URLs were posted,
and found that 271 out of the 382 URLs (70.94%) were
posted using the same source / social media manage-
ment platform on both the networks. For the remain-
ing 111 URLs, although the app names did not match,
we discovered that they were also posted using cross
platform content sharing sources, which connect users’
Facebook and Twitter accounts, like the Twitter app
for Facebook etc. Figure 2 represents the distribution of
the various platforms used for all the 382 URLs on both
networks. HootSuite clearly appeared to be the most
commonly used platform for posting content across the
two networks.
HootSuite()(236(
Share_bookmarklet()(24(
Web()(18(
RSS(Graffi<()(12(
TweetDeck()(9(
WordPress.com)(9(
Buffer()(8(
Links()(8(
twiJerfeed()(6(
Others()(52(
(a) URL sources on Facebook
HootSuite()(227(
Facebook()(94(
TweetDeck()(9(
Buffer()(8(
WordPress.com()(5(
twiAerfeed(()(5(
Others()(34(
(b) URL sources on Twitter
Figure 2: URL sources on Facebook and Twitter
for the 382 URLs which appeared on both the
networks at the same time. A majority of these
URLs were shared using famous cross content
sharing platforms like HootSuite, TweetDeck,
Twitterfeed etc.
With such observations, it appeared that these URLs
may have been posted from Facebook and Twitter ac-
counts belonging to the same real world user. To con-
firm our findings, we extracted the user handles, and
user names of all these users on both Facebook, and
Twitter, and computed a similarity score using the Jaro
Distance metric [15]. Four similarity scores were com-
puted for each URL:
1. Twitterhandle : Facebookhandle
2. Twitterhandle : Facebookname
3. Twittername : Facebookhandle
4. Twittername : Facebookname
6
We found that for 265 out of the 382 URLs (69.37%),
at least one of the 4 aforementioned scores came out to
be greater than 0.85. In fact, for 209 URLs (54.71%),
at least one of these 4 values came out to be 1, i.e.
exact match. We could not determine Facebook user-
names and handles for 19 users; these accounts were
either deleted, or the username and handle fields were
not available. With this analysis, it is safe to conclude
that at least 70% of URLs which are posted on two so-
cial networks (Facebook and Twitter in this case) at
the same time, are posted by the same real world user.
Like URLs, this analysis can also be performed by look-
ing at timestamps of posts containing identical textual
content on Facebook and Twitter, and could possibly
yield an even bigger set of users who post content on
both these networks at the same time. This character-
istic can be a helpful feature in connecting two online
identities across social networks to a single real world
person, where existing accuracy rates have much scope
of improvement [14]. However, performing this analysis
is beyond the scope of our work.
4.5 Inter-network URLs
Apart from studying common URLs which appeared
on both networks, we investigated the amount of inter-
network content sharing on Facebook and Twitter. We
extracted and fully expanded all the URLs shared across
all 16 events on both these networks. In total, we got a
total of 2.11 million URLs posted on Facebook, and 6.90
million URLs posted on Twitter. We then extracted
the domains of all these URLs, and found that Twit-
ter shared more facebook.com URLs than the number
of twitter.com URLs shared on Facebook. On average,
2.5% (σ = 2.1) of all URLs shared on Twitter belonged
to the facebook.com domain, but only 0.8% (σ = 1.0)
of all URLs shared on Facebook belonged to the twit-
ter.com domain. On average (during the 16 events), in
terms of ranking, twitter.com was the 17th most shared
domain on Facebook (σ = 9.3), and facebook.com was
the 12th most shared domain in Twitter (σ = 12.5).
Further, in terms of percentage of URLs, Twitter URLs
were most popular on Facebook during the Navy Yard
Shooting event; while Facebook URLs were most pop-
ular on Twitter during the North India Floods.
Table 4 presents the ranking and percentage of Twit-
ter, YouTube, and Instagram URLs shared on Face-
book; and Facebook, YouTube and Instagram URLs
shared on Twitter. Interestingly, we found YouTube
to be ranked very high on both Facebook and Twitter
during most events. On average, YouTube was ranked
3rd (σ = 1.4) and 7th (σ = 4.4) on Facebook and Twit-
ter respectively. Instagram was ranked fairly low on
Facebook (amongst top 100 during only 4 out of the 16
events); but was amongst the top 100 during 14 out of
the 16 events on Twitter.
These numbers highlight that apart from posting sim-
ilar content during real world events, Facebook and
Twitter users also post a significant amount of con-
tent picked from each other. It was also interesting
to see that YouTube was one of the most famous do-
mains shared on both the networks. It could be inter-
esting to perform a similar content overlap analysis for
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and see how much
YouTube content is present on both these networks.
5. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
To get a qualitative overview of the content, and ex-
tract a true positive dataset of spam, we decided to ex-
tract the most active users, and their posts from both
Facebook and Twitter as a sample. Ideally, analyzing
the entire dataset would have been a good approach
to compare the spam content of both the social net-
works during the 16 events. However, such amount of
data would have been extremely difficult to annotate
manually, and extract true positive spam. We thus de-
cided to analyze content posted by only the most active
users during these events, to get a qualitative overview
of the content, and for our spam analysis. The rea-
son for choosing this approach over random sampling
was two-fold. Firstly, since the users we pick with this
approach contribute the maximum content, the proba-
bility of their post appearing in a search executed by a
common user would be more than that of a post made
by a random user. We believe that it would be inter-
esting to study the content and users that a common
user comes across, and consumes from social media dur-
ing a real-world event. Statistically, pieces of content
generated by the most active users would have a higher
probability of popping up during searches made by com-
mon users, and hence useful to study. Secondly, normal
random sampling approaches would have led to a biased
overall dataset in terms of numbers, because of the vary-
ing number of users and posts generated during different
events. For example, a 1% random sample would have
generated over 12,000 Facebook users during IPL, but
only 10 users during the Kashmir earthquake (Table 1).
Our approach of picking the most active users is scal-
able, and yields a comparable and manageable number
of users for almost all events, irrespective of the total
number of users or posts generated during an event.
5.1 Selecting most active users
To extract the most active users, we calculated the
content gain factor associated with each user present in
our dataset. The content gain factor associated with a
user was calculated by the fraction of content added by
the user during an event through the number of posts
he / she made during the event. For each event, we
sorted the users in decreasing order of the number of
posts made by them during the event. Starting from
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Facebook Twitter
Twitter YouTube Instagram Facebook YouTube Instagram
Event Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank %
North India Floods 23 0.15 3 4.0 324 0.006 3 7.18 6 4.50 7 4.49
Boston Blasts 5 1.91 2 2.65 172 0.06 8 1.28 2 3.97 4 2.00
Oklahoma Tornado 17 0.34 2 6.24 107 0.05 2 5.38 3 3.77 5 2.63
Mothers Day Shooting - - 4 25 - - 31 0.46 8 2.72 199 0.05
London Terror Attack 16 0.63 2 9.34 409 0.01 15 0.93 5 5.60 58 0.14
IPL 14 0.59 2 5.36 247 0.01 4 4.03 6 3.78 28 0.54
Navy Yard Shooting 3 4.32 5 2.94 40 0.35 22 0.70 5 2.91 97 0.13
Champions Trophy 27 0.15 2 4.82 192 0.02 2 5.42 3 5.29 5 3.85
Birth of Royal Baby 10 1.17 2 3.89 52 0.16 11 1.19 8 1.38 6 1.74
Kashmir Earthquake - - - - - - 12 0.89 11 1.45 39 0.22
Iran Earthquake 34 0.49 1 24.50 - - 16 1.13 10 2.66 29 0.50
Creation of Telangana 33 0.03 2 10.74 717 0.001 6 4.88 3 5.71 32 0.36
Cyclone Phailin 17 0.90 5 1.81 662 0.009 5 2.48 11 1.16 123 0.09
Typhoon Haiyan 16 0.53 2 4.81 20 0.50 4 2.75 9 1.90 12 1.45
Metro North Derailment 12 1.28 6 2.56 48 0.32 48 0.34 19 1.11 34 0.57
RIP Nelson Mandela 12 0.29 2 8.32 134 0.03 4 1.95 3 3.17 5 1.82
Table 4: Rank and percentage of Twitter / Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram URLs on Facebook
/ Twitter. Facebook URLs were found to be more popular on Twitter, than Twitter URLs were
popular on Facebook. YouTube was found to be one of the most famous domains on both Facebook
and Twitter during almost all events.
the “most active” user in terms of the number of posts,
we calculated the content gain as follows:
Algorithm 1 Extracting most active users
c sum = 0
for all users do
c sum = c sum + num posts by user
if (num posts by user / c sum) × 100 > k then
Consider user
else
Ignore user
end if
end for
In Algorithm 1, k is a tunable parameter which can
be chosen as required. The value of k is directly propor-
tional to the content generated by a user chosen; thus,
a high value of k would only yield very highly active
users. For our experiment, we picked a value of k = 3,
which left us with a total of 252 unique Twitter users
contributing 222,529 tweets, and 220 unique Facebook
users contributing 66,688 posts, across the 16 events.
Choosing a lower value of k could have increased these
numbers, and made our sample richer and more rep-
resentative, but at the same time, it would have made
the sample very hard and unmanageable to annotate
and analyze manually.
5.2 Manual classification of most active users
We manually went through the user profiles and con-
tent posted by the 472 most active users (252 from
Twitter + 220 from Facebook) which we extracted from
the previous step, and marked these users as spammers,
and non-spammers. We did not use multiple annota-
tors, or inter-annotator agreement strategies for this
annotation, as our annotation classes were distinct and
non-confusing. Spammers were marked so because of
highly repetitive and / or irrelevant content. Figure 3
shows an example of a spam post on Facebook and
Twitter. Table 5 represents the detailed statistics of
the users in our most active users dataset.
(a) Spam on Facebook
(b) Spam on Twitter
Figure 3: Examples of spam posts on Facebook
and Twitter.
5.3 Qualitative overview
After removing the false positives, we were left with a
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Category Facebook Twitter
Users 48 242
Pages 160 -
- Verified 7 7
- Spammers 25 37
- False positives 29 33
Suspended - 7
Deleted / Not found 12 3
Total 220 252
Table 5: Detailed statistics of the most active
users on Facebook and Twitter captured during
16 real-world events.
total of 191 Facebook users, contributing 59,148 posts,
and 219 Twitter users contributing 196,880 tweets. 8
Surprisingly, Facebook content posted by the most ac-
tive users was found to be highly irrelevant to the events
during which, the data was collected. Infact, the con-
tent looked alarmingly polar, and radical. This spam
and propaganda content completely overshadowed the
relevant content about the events under consideration,
highlighting the prevailing nature of topic hijacking on
Facebook, which has been observed previously on In-
ternet forums. The tag cloud of the most frequently
occurring words in this content looked very similar to
the tag cloud of spam content, shown in Figure 5(a),
and did not give a clear picture. Upon further man-
ual inspection, we found that this behavior was due
to a few spammers who were posting enormously large
pieces of such propaganda content repeatedly, during
the Royal Baby event; thus overshadowing all the nor-
mal length relevant posts. On the other hand, Twitter
content looked fairly usual, and most of the top key-
words were related to one of the 16 events.
We then removed the spammers in addition to false
positives, and repeated this analysis for both Facebook
and Twitter to get a clearer picture of the relevant con-
tent posted by the most active users on both these net-
works. Removing spammers in addition to false posi-
tives yielded a total of 169 Facebook users (contribut-
ing 52,615 posts), and 182 Twitter users (contributing
173,325 tweets). Figures 4(a) and 4(b) represent the top
100 most frequently occurring keywords in this content.
The alarmingly polar content overshadowing relevant
content on Facebook prompted us to further investigate
spam posted by the most active users on Facebook, and
compare it with spam on Twitter. We discuss our in-
depth analysis on spam in Section 6.
6. SPAM ANALYSIS
As discussed in Section 5.3, studying Facebook con-
tent revealed an alarming amount of spam content and
8False positives were users whose content was captured
merely because their usernames matched at least one event
related keyword.
(a) Facebook content without spam and false positives
(b) Twitter content without spam and false positives
Figure 4: Tag cloud of the 100 most frequently
posted words by most active users on Face-
book and Twitter during 16 real-world events.
Facebook content looks totally irrelevant to the
events.
users, which we decided to investigate in detail. We ob-
served that contrary to regular behavior, where more
than 75% content was generated by Facebook pages
(Table 5); in case of spam, 68% contributors were users.
In a recent article, Facebook also pointed that a lot of
spam posts are published by pages; and announced im-
provements to reduce such spam in their News Feed. 9
In terms of events, we observed that spam was present
in only 5 out of the 16 events on Facebook, as opposed
to Twitter, where spam was found to be present in 13
out of the 16 events. We discovered a striking differ-
ence between spam on Facebook and Twitter as well.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) represent the tag cloud of the
top 100 most frequently occurring words in spam posts
on Facebook and Twitter respectively. As is evident
from the figures, spam content on Facebook looked com-
pletely non-relevant to the events under consideration,
while spam content on Twitter was a mix of event re-
lated keywords and other famous keywords, viz. Justin
Bieber, Apple, Obama etc., which are usually trending
on Twitter, and on the web in general.
6.1 Facebook spam classification
This phenomenal difference between spam content
9http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/04/
news-feed-fyi-cleaning-up-news-feed-spam/
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(a) Spam content on Facebook
(b) Spam content on Twitter
Figure 5: Spam content on Facebook and Twit-
ter. Facebook spam was found to be radical in
nature, irrelevant to the events under consider-
ation, and very different from Twitter spam.
on Facebook and Twitter prompted us to probe fur-
ther. Apart from discovering that more users post spam
than pages, we noticed some more distinct characteris-
tics about spam content on Facebook. These included
enormously large pieces of content, intense repetition,
more frequent presence of URLs, etc. in spam posts.
We decided to extract these features and apply machine
learning algorithms on our labeled dataset of spam and
non-spam posts that we extracted from our manually
annotated dataset of most active users (Section 5.2).
There have been multiple attempts to detect spam on
Twitter in the past [2, 8, 20, 31]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to detect
spam posts on Facebook using machine learning tech-
niques. Conforming to our preliminary observations
about notable differences between spammers and non-
spammers, we were able to achieve a maximum accuracy
of 99.9% using the Random Forest Classifier trained on
a set of 21 features, as listed in Table 6.
Some of the features marked with ∗ in Table 6 have
been previously used for spam classification on Twit-
ter [2] and emails [29]. We introduced two new stylo-
metric features viz. post repetition factor, and hashtag
repetition factor to capture the amount of repetition
within a post, which haven’t been used in the past for
spam classification. These features are a numeric value
ranging from 0 to 1, where a low value signifies higher
Feature Description
post richness∗ post words
post chars
post length Total length of the post
post chars Number of characters in the post
post rep factor post unique words
post words
post words Number of words in the post
post unique words Number of unique words in post
isPage True if the post comes from a page;
False otherwise
type Status / Link / Photo / Video
num fb urls Number of Facebook.com URLs
num urls∗ Number of URLs in the post
app Application used to post
num likes Number of likes on the post
pageLikes Number of likes on the page if isPage
is True
category Category of page if isPage is True
num hashtags∗ Number of hashtags in the post
num unique hashtags Number of unique hashtags in the post
num shares Number of times the post has been
shared
hashtag rep factor num unique hashtags
num hashtags
app ns Namespace of application
num short urls Number of short URLs in the post
num comments Number of comments on the post
Table 6: List of features used for spam classifi-
cation on Facebook, in decreasing order of sig-
nificance.
repetition. Most of the other features like number of
likes, number of comments, number of shares, applica-
tion name, application namespace, category, type, page-
Likes etc. can be directly obtained from Facebook’s
Graph API.
We ran the Naive Bayesian, J48 Decision Tree, and
Random Forest classifiers on our labeled dataset of 7,882
spam posts, and 58,806 non-spam posts from the most
active users, using the aforementioned set of 21 fea-
tures. The Random Forest classifier achieved the maxi-
mum accuracy of 99.90%. This exceptionally high value
was not surprising, as we were able to find notable dif-
ferences in spam and non-spam posts during our ini-
tial manual investigation itself. Researchers in the past
have been able to achieve over 95% accuracy for classi-
fying spam on Twitter too [20], but these accuracy rates
correspond to a general stream of data, and with an ex-
tremely rich feature set. In contrast, the dataset we
used for our spam classification contained posts specific
to real world events, and coming from only the most
active users. This makes the task of spam identifica-
tion easier for the classification algorithms, since the
input data to the classifier is highly restricted. Note
that these results may differ drastically on a general,
random sample of Facebook posts. Our objective is not
to propose new, or compete with existing feature sets
and machine learning algorithms for detecting spam on
Facebook and Twitter, but to highlight the fact that
spam posted during real world events by the most ac-
tive users differs drastically from genuine content.
From our classification results, we noticed that all
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the 6 post level features viz. post richness, post length,
number of words, number of unique words, number of
characters, and post repetition factor came out to be
the highest ranked (most significant) features. We then
decided to remove these 6 features, and run the algo-
rithms again on a depleted feature set containing only
15 out of the 21 features as mentioned in Table 6. Sur-
prisingly, we were still able to achieve an exception-
ally high accuracy of 99.30% using the Random Forest
classifier. It was interesting to see that the number of
likes, comments, and shares did not turn out to be im-
portant features. These results also bring out the fact
that it might be easier to detect spam on Facebook, as
compared to what we have learnt about Twitter from
existing literature. However, we would like to extend
our analysis on a bigger labeled dataset, and verify our
results in future. In order to do so, we intend to gen-
erate a larger manually annotated labeled dataset for
Facebook spam using multiple human annotators.
6.2 Twitter spam classification
To check if there exist similar striking differences be-
tween spam and non-spam content posted by most ac-
tive users on Twitter as well, we performed the same
classification tasks on our Twitter data using a very sim-
ilar feature set. Our Twitter dataset consisted of 23,555
spam tweets, and 198,974 non-spam tweets posted by
252 most active users during the 16 events. The feature
set we used for tweets is shown in Table 7.
Feature Description
tweet richness∗ tweet words
tweet chars
num unique hashtags∗ Number of unique hashtags in tweet
num hashtags∗ Total number of hashtags in tweet
tweet chars Number of characters in tweet
num plain tokens Number of words excluding hashtags,
@mentions and URLs
tweet words Total number of words tweet
tweet unique words Number of unique words in tweet
tweet source Mobile / Web / 3rd party app / Other
isRetweet True if tweet is a retweet; False other-
wise
tweet rep factor tweet unique words
tweet words
num urls∗ Number of URLs in tweet
hasMedia True if tweet has picture / video; False
otherwise
hashtag rep factor num unique hashtags
num hashtags
num mentions Number of @mentions in tweet
num unique mentions∗ Number of unique @mentions in tweet
mention rep factor num unique mentions
num mentions
Table 7: List of features used for spam classifi-
cation on Twitter, in decreasing order of signif-
icance.
Similar to Facebook, we were able to achieve a high
accuracy of 98.2% using the Random Forest classifier
trained over this set of 16 features. This proved that
there exist some obvious differences in the spam and
non-spam content posted by most active users during
real world events even in Twitter, unlike spam and non-
spam content posted by common users in general. Ta-
ble 8 summarizes our classification results.
Classifier OSM (fea-
tures)
Accuracy F-Score
Naive Bayesian
FB (21) 93.00% 0.927
FB (15) 94.03% 0.945
Twitter 90.67% 0.874
J48 DecisionTree
FB (21) 99.82% 0.998
FB (15) 99.24% 0.992
Twitter 98.06% 0.98
Random Forest
FB (21) 99.90% 0.999
FB (15) 99.30% 0.993
Twitter 98.20% 0.982
Table 8: Classification results for Naive
Bayesian, J48 Decision Tree, and Random For-
est classifiers. Even with the 6 most important
features removed, we were able to achieve an
accuracy of over 99% for Facebook.
6.3 When do spammers post?
Figure 6 shows the number of spam posts per hour
on Facebook and Twitter, during the first 10 days (240
hours) of all the 5 events, where we found spam on
Facebook. We found no correlation between the publish
time of spam posts on Facebook and Twitter during any
event (correl = 0.089; σ = 0.013). Interestingly, during
most events, we observed spiking behavior on Facebook.
This possibly reflects that spammers on Facebook do
not post spam regularly during an event; but post infre-
quently, and in bulk. On the other hand, spam on Twit-
ter was observed to be fairly regular during most events.
In fact, during the Telangana event (Figure 6(d)), we
found highly automated behavior (most likely a bot
account), where a user was posting a tweet after ex-
actly 30 minutes (i.e. exactly 2 posts per hour consis-
tently; as visible in the graph). Zhang et al. proposed
techniques to study automated activity on Twitter [34],
and found that accounts exhibiting such behavior were
highly likely to be automated bots.
The Nelson Mandela event witnessed two sub events;
viz. Nelson Mandela’s death on December 5 (hour 0),
and his funeral on December 12 (hour 168). This is
reflected by the dip in the graph in Figure 6(b), ap-
proximately between hour 80 and hour 168.
7. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In this paper, we presented a comparative analysis
between Facebook and Twitter, and showed that there
is a high overlap in the content of the two networks dur-
ing real world events. We also showed that Facebook is
quite fast at breaking and spreading content during real
world events. Our analysis is based on a dataset con-
taining publicly available content from Facebook and
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Figure 6: Number of spam posts per hour, during 5 events for the first 10 days (240 hours) on
Facebook and Twitter. Facebook depicted spiking behavior, while Twitter was less spiking, and
fairly regular.
Twitter during 16 international events. The represen-
tativeness of this data is limited by the proportion of
content which is public on these networks.
It may be argued that the dynamics and purposes of
Facebook totally differ from that of Twitter, and that
the basis of such a comparison is questionable. How-
ever, we would like to point out that from a user’s
point of view, Facebook and Twitter are extremely sim-
ilar. Both networks are timeline based, and users get to
see content from only those entities which they choose
(subscribed pages and friends on Facebook, and fol-
lowed users on Twitter). On both networks, users can
search for a topic, or click on a hashtag or trending topic
(which is now also available on Facebook), to see what
is being talked about the topic on the entire network as
a whole. Users on both the networks, get to see only
public content. Specially, when it comes to real-world
events, one can argue that both Twitter and Facebook
users are equally likely to learn (or not learn) about an
event from the network, based on their interests and
subscription.
One of the limitations of our work is the absence
of Twitter data for the first few hours after an event
occurs in the real world. This happened because the
framework we used for collecting data, required man-
ual input to start data collection for an event. We were
thus able to initiate data collection for an event, only as
soon as we learnt about the occurrence of the event. An
alternate approach for data collection could have been
to continuously collect a stream of tweets for trending
topics, and then extract events from the stream. How-
ever, this approach is also bound to suffer from some
delay, since it takes at least a couple of hours for an
event to take place in the real world, and the topic to
start trending on Twitter. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there does not exist a way to be able to collect
100 per cent data for an event, unless the occurrence of
the event is pre-determined, as in the case of events like
IPL, Champions Trophy, birth of the Royal Baby etc.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
at comparing Facebook with Twitter content on such
a large scale. No previous work has studied Facebook
content during real world events. Apart from content in
general, we analyzed the use of hashtags and URLs, and
brought some interesting results to light, like presence
of hashtags on Facebook before the launch of its official
support by Facebook. We also highlighted how URLs
posted on two networks at the same time can be used
to connect two accounts on different social networks to
the same real-world user.
In future, we intend to group together similar events
in terms of geographic location, duration (short lived
/ long lasting), crisis / non-crisis, and expected / un-
expected, and compare Facebook and Twitter behavior
within, and across similar events. Due to space con-
straints, we could not add such analysis in this work.
We would also like to explore ways of extracting net-
work information from Facebook. This would help us
in getting insights on community detection and content
propagation during an event within the network, which
have been previously studied on Twitter [9].
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